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(1991).
I. FACTS
As first introduced in 1978, the regulation1 implementing § 7 of
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA or Act)2 required every
federal agency to consult with the Department of the Interior whenever
an agency activity, foreign or domestic, threatened to jeopardize the
continued existence of a species listed as endangered. 3 Later, the
Secretary of the Interior (Secretary)4 revised this regulation to elim-
inate the consultation requirement on foreign projects.' The Defenders
of Wildlife (Defenders) 6 responded to this limitation of the "con-
Interagency Cooperation- Endangered Species Act, 50 C.F.R. § 402 (1978).
2 Under § 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988),
a federal agency that authorizes, funds, or carries out any action must consult with
the Secretary of the Interior to insure that the action is "not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
3 The 1978 regulation stated: "When a federal agency identifies activities or
programs that may affect listed species or their habitat, the agency shall convey a
written request for consultation with available information to ... the Director [of
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) or the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS)] if foreign countries . . . are involved." 43 Fed. Reg. 875 (1978)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(3) (1978)). The extraterritorial application of § 7
was justified by "the Act's broad, inclusive language; its legislative history; and its
policy implications." Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 124 (8th Cir.
1990), cert. granted, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991).
4 Donald P. Hodel.
, On June 3, 1986, the Secretary published a new rule which limited the "con-
sultation provision" of the Act to those actions occurring in the United States or
on the high seas. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (1986) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a)(1986)).
The limitation of the extraterritorial application of § 7 was attributed to "the apparent
domestic orientation of the consultation and exemption processes resulting from the
[1978] Amendments, and because of the potential for interference with the sovereignty
of foreign nations." Id. at 19,929. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
6 Defenders of Wildlife were joined by two other environmental organizations:
Friends of Animals and Their Environment and the Humane Society of the United
States. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43 (D. Minn. 1987).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 21:575
sultation provision" by filing suit against the Secretary of the Interior
in federal district court,7 seeking the reinstallation of a regulation
recognizing the full consultative process. 8
The district court initially dismissed the suit for lack of standing.9
Upon remand, however, the court granted summary judgment for
Defenders and ordered the publication of a final regulation recog-
nizing the consultative process for all agency activities regardless of
location.' 0 The Secretary appealed this ruling" arguing, inter alia,
that the language and legislative history of the Act show that Congress
did not intend for the consultation requirement to apply to federal
agency projects in foreign countries. 2 Defenders disagreed, inter-
Id.
A Id. at 45.
9 Id. at 48. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court's conclusion, holding that an environmental organization has standing to
challenge a Department of Interior regulation providing that federal agencies with
activities in foreign countries had no duty to consult with the Secretary about potential
impact on endangered species. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th
Cir. 1988).
,0 In holding that the 1986 regulations were contrary to the Act, the court focused
on the language of the Act and on congressional intent as evidenced by the Act's
legislative history. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082, 1084-86 (D.
Minn. 1989). First, the court found that the language of the Act "plainly states
that federal agencies are required to consult with the Secretary regarding projects
in foreign countries [which may jeopardize an endangered species]." Id. at 1084.
In support of this finding, the court noted the distinction between the all-inclusive
language of § 7, which does not differentiate between localities, and the more narrow
language of other sections which applies to either the United States or a foreign
country, but not both. Id. at 1085. The court viewed § 7's all-inclusive language
as, on the part of Congress, "intentional language expressing a concern that the
consultation provisions be given affect wherever agency action took place." Id.
Furthermore, the court found congressional approval of the extraterritorial scope
of the regulations in the interplay between the statute and the federal regulations
which occurred during the 1978 ESA amendment process. Id. The 1978 revisions to
the ESA occurred after promulgation of the original regulations. See Endangered
Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453. Even though the revisions yielded no substantive changes to
the Act, the court reasoned that by retaining the existing law Congress gave its
"stamp of approval" on the law and its accompanying regulations. Id. at 1086. See
also Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
1988), where the court in interpreting the Endangered Species Act relied on the rule
of statutory construction that Congress is "aware of an administrative or judicial
interpretation of a statute and [adopts] that interpretation when it reenacts a statute
without change." Id. at 1109 n.6 (citing Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management,
470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985)).
" Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990). Manual Lujan
replaced Donald P. Hodel as Secretary of Interior in 1989.
2 Id. at 122.
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preting the language of the Act and its legislative history as contrary
to the 1986 revised regulations. 3 In affirming the lower court's ruling,
the appellate court held, the consultation requirement of the Endan-
gered Species Act was applicable to all federal agency actions, in-
cluding activities in foreign nations, whenever such actions are likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered species. De-
fenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991)
(argued Dec. 3, 1991).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Legislative Background
With the enactment of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, ' 4
Congress, for the first time, extended federal protection over all
species "endangered"' 5 or "threatened' '1 6 with extinction. Prior to
this time, two wildlife conservation acts had been passed-the En-
dangered Species Act of 196617 and the Endangered Species Conser-
vation Act of 19691-but neither had produced notable practical
impact. 9 Both Acts were hampered by two fatal flaws: (1) neither
contained meaningful enforcement provisions; and (2) neither ad-
13 Id.
14 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 885 (1973)
(current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988)).
11 "Endangered species" means "any species which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a species of the Class
Insecta." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1988). "Endangered species" are listed at 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.11 (1990).
,1 "Threatened species" means "any species which is likely to become an en-
dangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion
of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1988). "Threatened species" are listed at 50
C.F.R. § 17.11 (1990).
11 Endangered Species Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966)
(repealed 1973).
11 Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat.
275 (1969) (repealed 1973).
19 The Endangered Species Act of 1966, for instance, established an endangered
species program, which though meritorious in principle, lacked substance as it only
applied "insofar as is practicable and consistent with the primary purposes" of
federal agencies. 80 Stat. at 926 (1966). Compare with the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the 1973 ESA that "endangered species [are given] priority over the
primary missions of the federal agencies." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978).
The Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969 extended protection to foreign
species and prohibited their importation, but it likewise failed to address the issue
of regulation of federal agency actions. 83 Stat. at 275 (1969).
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dressed the greatest threat to endangered species, habitat destruction. 20
Notwithstanding this limited practical impact, the Endangered Species
Acts of 1966 and 1969 did establish the principle that the federal
government has a legitimate interest in the global protection of wildlife
threatened with extinction.
With this framework in mind and sensing the need for tougher
environmental laws, 2' Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act
of 1973 "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be con-
served.1"22 Thus, the Endangered Species Act as passed not only served
to preserve and protect threatened wildlife, but it recognized the vital
nature of the preservation of habitat. By any account, the ESA of
1973 proved to be a watershed in federal environmental law. 23
Of the substantive portions of the Act, § 7 and § 9 are considered
the most powerful.24 Entitled "Interagency Cooperation," § 7 requires
all federal agencies to use their powers in consultation with the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)25 to insure that their actions are
"not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species. "26 Furthermore, § 7 states that an agency
2 See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 179 (citing Hearings on Endangered Species
before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
93d Cong. 1st Sess. 202, 236 (1973) (statement of Associate Deputy Chief for National
Forest System, Department of Agriculture)).
21 The Senate Commerce Committee noted that it "had become increasingly
apparent that some sort of protective measures... [had to] be taken to prevent
the further extinction of the world's animal species." See S. REP. No. 307, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990.
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1973) (current version at 16
U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988)).
23 "The Endangered Species Act of 1973 represented the most comprehensive
legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation."
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 180 (quoting Chief Justice Burger).
24 The plaintiff's allegations in this suit, however, did not include violations of
§ 9 and, therefore, this note will concentrate on § 7. Moreover, § 9, which forbids
any person from "taking" an endangered species, only applies to actions undertaken
by persons within the United States or at sea. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1988). In its markup
session on the Endangered Species Act, the conference committee specifically rejected
language that would have expanded the takings prohibition to anyone subject to
U.S. jurisdiction, including takings in foreign countries. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 740,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 3005.
23 An agency may be required to consult with the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) depending upon the species involved. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (1990).
26 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988); see supra notes 16 and 17 for definitions of
"endangered species" and "threatened species".
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must not act in a way that is likely to have an adverse impact on a
listed species habitat.27
When Congress first adopted the ESA, 21 it failed to realize the
importance of § 7.29 Only two sentences on § 7 were included in the
legislative history of the Act.30 The judicial and executive branches,
however, quickly felt the full force behind § 7's seemingly simple
language. 3'
B. Judicial Interpretation
In the courts, environmental organizations reacted swiftly to the
passage of the ESA, sensing a new tool by which they could further
their goals. Nine months after enactment, the Sierra Club amended
its complaint in Sierra Club v. Froehlke,32 a suit filed to halt con-
struction of a dam, to allege a violation of the Act. Stressing that
the ESA must be construed "reasonably," the circuit court held that
an agency satisfies § 7 of the Act by consulting with the Department
of the Interior even if it later disregards Interior's advice.3 3 Thus,
the initial judicial interpretation of the ESA favored a narrow reading
of the Act's language which allowed the court to use its equitable
powers to ensure a "reasonable" outcome. 34
27 Id.
28 The Act was adopted on December 28, 1973. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat.
885 (1973).See John C. Beiers, Comment, The International Applicability of Section 7 of
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 171, 179 n.41 (1989).
30 The Senate Report accompanying the proposed ESA legislation stated: "All
agencies, departments, and other instrumentalities of the Federal government are
directed to cooperate in the implementation of the goals of this act. Each agency
shall, inter alia, take steps to 'insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried
out' by it do not jeopardize the continued existence of any such species or result
in the destruction of its habitat." S. Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted
in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2997; Beiers, supra note 29.
3, Since enactment, 43 cases have reached trial alleging violation of the ESA of
1973. (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Courts File). Furthermore, the USFWS initiates an
average of 2000 § 7 consultation processes per year. Dale Russakoff, Losses: En-
dangered Species Act Stemming the Trend, WASMNGTON POST, Jan. 1, 1984, at Al.
32 392 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975). In this case the Sierra Club contended
that the Meramac Park Lake Dam Project in Missouri, undertaken by the Army
Corps of Engineers, would jeopardize the existence of the endangered Indiana bat
by destroying its habitat. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that since only
a few bats would be affected, no violation of the Act existed. 534 F.2d 1289, 1305
(1976).
33 Id. at 1301.
34 See id.
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Contemporary and subsequent courts, however, ruled that in en-
acting the ESA, Congress made it clear that endangered species were
to be accorded the highest of priorities." This broad interpretation
was ultimately brought before the Supreme Court, where, in TVA
v. Hill,3 6 the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's holding that the plain
language and the legislative history of the Act supported an expansive
interpretation.3 7 In his opinion, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that
the "pointed omission of the type of qualifying language previously
included in endangered species legislation ' 38 revealed a "conscious
decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the
'primary missions' of the federal agencies." ' 39 The Court held that
such unequivocal language required the application of the Act when-
ever the continued existence of an endangered species was jeopard-
ized.40 In so ruling, the Court emphasized that the "reasonableness"
of the outcome of the Act's application was not a relevant factor
when considering the application of the ESA. 41
11 See National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 400 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Miss.),
rev'd, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976), in which an
environmental organization successfully petitioned the court for an injunction to
halt construction of a highway through the habitat of the endangered Mississippi
sandhill crane. In granting the injunction, the court held that the plain language of
the Act imposes on each federal agency a mandatory duty to insure its actions are
not likely to jeopardize a listed species. 529 F.2d at 711. In Defenders of Wildlife
v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 168-69 (D.D.C. 1977), the district court held that
regulations promulgated by the Secretary which allowed hunting at night could result
in the shooting of endangered species of migratory birds and, therefore, was in-
consistent with a broad reading of the ESA. Id.
36 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
37 Id. at 184. In this case a group of citizens sued the TVA to halt the final
completion of an 80% constructed dam over the Little Tennessee River. Bolstered
by the recent discovery of the snail darter-a three-inch long fish that evidently only
lived in the free-flowing waters of the Little Tennessee-the group alleged that
completion of the dam would stop the waters from flowing, and destroy the "critical
habitat" of the snail darter, putting the continued existence of the species in jeopardy.
TVA, 437 U.S. 153.
1' See supra notes 17-19 concerning ESA precursors.
39 TVA, 437 U.S. at 185.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 194. Recently, however, this interpretation has been challenged by those
who claim that economic factors should be given more weight in the application of
the ESA. Carol Bradley, Angry Westerners to Protest Congress Over Endangered
Act, Gannett News Service, Sept. 6, 1991 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt
File. Moreover, a bill pending before Congress, The Human Protection Act, would
amend the ESA to allow economic consequences to be considered in the listing of
an endangered species. H.R. 3092, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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TVA v. Hill represented the Supreme Court's approval of the broad
interpretation given the Act by a majority of the recent judicial
opinions. 42 Since this decision, the scope of the ESA of 1973 has
consistently been interpreted broadly. In North Slope Boroughs v.
Andrus,43 native Alaskans brought an action to enjoin the Secretary
of Interior from carrying out a lease of federal properties off the
north shore of the Alaskan coast, claiming that such action would
jeopardize the continued existence of the bowhead whale. In holding
that § 7 of the Act should be interpreted broadly, the court dismissed
the Secretary's argument that only the lease sale, and not prospective
actions, constituted agency actions." Likewise, in Conner v. Buford,45
the court broadly interpreted the scope of agency action broadly to
encompass all phases of such action, including post-leasing activities. 46
In Conner, environmental groups filed an action claiming that the
sale of oil and gas leases in national forests without a biological
opinion assessing the impact of leasing activities violated § 7 of the
ESA. The court held that the broad scope of § 7 required the USFWS
to consider all the ramifications of such a lease.47
C. Regulatory Interpretations
In contrast to the courts' shift away from a narrow interpretation
of § 7, the executive branch of government has recently construed
the ESA to exclude agency actions in foreign countries. 48 This narrow
interpretation was revealed in the 1986 revisions of the regulations
that implement § 7 of the Act. 49 In adopting these revisions, the
Interior Department amended its earlier regulations which required
the extraterritorial application of § 7.10 These first regulations prom-
42 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
41 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980) rev'd on other grounds, 642 F.2d 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
642 F.2d at 608.
848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988).
46 Id. at 1453.
47 Id.
- 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1990).
49 The 1986 regulations stated: "Section 7(a)(2) of the Act requires every Federal
agency ... to insure that any action it authorizes, funds, or carries out, in the
United States or upon the high seas, is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence
of any listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat." 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (1986) (emphasis added).
10 The 1978 regulations stated: "[Section 7] requires every Federal agency to insure
that its activities or programs in the United States, upon the high Seas, and in
foreign countries will not jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species." 50
C.F.R. § 402.01 (1978) (emphasis added).
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ulgated under § 7 required consultation whenever an agency action,
foreign or domestic, was likely to jeopardize a listed species.5 The
revised 1986 regulations, however, limited the consultation provision
by narrowing the term "agency action" to exclude actions in foreign
countries .52
The Secretary of the Interior supported curtailment of the extra-
territorial application of § 7 by noting two factors. First, he cited
the apparent domestic orientation of the consultation and exemption
processes which resulted from the 1978 amendments to the ESA.5 3
Next, the Secretary cited the potential for interference with the sov-
ereignty of foreign nations as rationale supporting a change in the
regulations .14
Although the Department of the Interior possesses broad discre-
tionary powers concerning enforcement of the ESA, the 1986 regu-
lations appear to exceed the Department's authority in its
implementation of ESA regulations. Moreover, the Department's in-
terpretation is in direct conflict with the broad interpretation given
the Act by the courts. This lack of uniformity in the interpretation
of § 7 results in confusion about the proper interpretation and scope
of the Endangered Species Act.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan," the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of the applicability of the consultation
provision of the Endangered Species Act of 197356 to federal agency
51 Id.
52 According to the 1986 regulations, "'Action' means all activities or programs
of any kind authorized, funded or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal
agencies in the United States or upon the high seas." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1990)
(emphasis added).
s3 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,929 (1986). See supra note 5.
Id. The Secretary made no argument supporting his conclusion that the prior
regulations had the "potential for interference with the sovereignty of foreign nations."
51 Fed. Reg. 19,929 (1986). However, his conclusion appears to follow the reasoning
of a 1981 Solicitor's Opinion which also concluded that § 7 does not apply to federal
agency actions in foreign countries. DANIEL J. RoHLF, Tim ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 177 (1989) (quoting Mem-
orandum from Assoc. Solicitor for Conservation & Wildlife, U.S. Dep't of the
Interior, to Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Fish, Wildlife, and Parks Division,
(Aug. 31, 1981)). The Solicitor had argued that "§ 7 consultation on federal actions
abroad would interfere with foreign sovereignty with respect to foreign nations'
development priorities and species conservation programs." Id.
35 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1988).
[Vol. 21:575
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE V. LuJAN
actions occurring in foreign countries.57 The court held that § 7 of
the Act imposes a duty upon all federal agencies to consult with the
Department of the Interior whenever any agency action is likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered or threatened
species. 8 In so ruling, the court rendered invalid regulations59 prom-
ulgated by the Secretary of Interior which required consultation only
when agency actions were undertaken in the United States or on the
seas. 60 Consequently, the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to resolve the conflict between the differing interpretations
given the Act by the courts and the Department of Interior.61 The
Supreme Court may, however, dismiss Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan
for lack of standing without considering the substantive issues raised
by the case. 62
The crux of the substantive issue turns upon the meaning of the
term "action" as used by the Congress in § 7 of the Act 63 In
11 Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 117.
11 Id. at 125.
59 50 C.F.R. § 402 (1990).
60 Id. at § 402.02.
61 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991).
62 The district court initially dismissed Defenders' suit for lack of standing, holding
that the plaintiffs failed to meet the standing requirements of Article III of the U.S.
Constitution. 658 F. Supp. at 48. The Eighth Circuit Court reversed the decision
of the district court, holding that the plaintiffs had met the constitutional requirements
for standing. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1043-44 (8th Cir.
1988). See supra note 9.
A private citizen's group can establish standing in a suit based on the ESA by
satisfying two elements: (1) prudential standing limitations and (2) constitutional
standing requirements. 851 F.2d at 1039. The prudential standing limitations are a
reflection of self-imposed judicial restraint and may be eliminated by Congress
through legislation. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100
(1979). The Eighth Circuit held that Congressional inclusion of a personal suit
provision in the ESA eliminated any prudential standing limitations. 851 F.2d. at
1039.
Although the Supreme Court may address prudential standing limitations, it will
more likely focus on the more demanding constitutional standing requirements. The
Court has stated that the constitutional standing requirements are: (1) that the party
have suffered actual or threatened injury- injury in fact; (2) that the injury be
caused by the challenged action- traceability; and (3) that the relief sought redress
the actual or threatened injury- redressability. Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
Although the Eighth Circuit Court held that Defenders had satisfied this test, a
recent Supreme Court decision narrowly construing constitutional standing require-
ments in environmental cases will undoubtedly subject the Defenders' case to intensive
scrutiny. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 108 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
63 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
19911
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
concluding that "action" encompasses all federal agency actions, the
court in Defenders of Wildlife focused on the language, structure
and legislative history of the Act. 64 The court noted that the simple,
all-inclusive nature of the language manifests a broad interpretation
of the term "action." 65 Section 7 states that "[e]ach federal agency
shall, in consultation with ... the Secretary, insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threat-
ened species . . . . "66 Echoing the Supreme Court's holding in TVA
v. Hill,67 the court concluded that this language "admits to no ex-
ceptions."" The court also ruled that the purpose and structure of
the ESA demonstrate congressional intent that the Act be applied to
all federal agency actions. 69 Specifically, the court noted that many
of the Act's sections require interaction with foreign countries which,
in the court's view, suggested a global rather than regional commit-
ment to wildlife conservation. 70 Finally, the court noted that the Act's
legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended for
the ESA to apply extraterritorially. 7' The court was particularly im-
pressed by Congress' tacit approval of the 1978 Interior regulations
which, at the time, required consultation for foreign agency actions.7 2
rA 911 F.2d at 125.
'5 Id. at 122.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (emphasis added).
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 122.
I9 d. at 123.
70 Id. The ESA of 1973 is replete with references evidencing the international
scope of its purpose. Congress declared the Act to be a pledge of commitment by
the United States for the preservation of species throughout the world. 16 U.S.C
§ 1531(4). The Act lists various international agreements to guide this pledge, 16
U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4)(F) (1988), such as the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T.
1087, 995 U.N.T.S. 243 (see infra note 101). Section 1537, entitled "International
Cooperation," declares that this commitment to worldwide protection of endangered
species will be backed by financial assistance, personnel assignments, investigations,
and by encouraging foreign nations to develop their own conservation programs. 16
U.S.C. § 1537 (1988 & Supp. I 1989); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(5) (1988).
Moreover, in listing an endangered species, the Secretary must not only take into
account "those efforts being made by ... a foreign nation ... to protect such
species," but he is also required to give actual notice and invite comment from each
foreign nation in which a species proposed for listing as endangered is found. 16
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(l)(A), (b)(5)(B) (1988).
11 Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 123.
72 Id. at 124; see supra note 10 for discussion of the 1978 amendment process.
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The Secretary argued that Congress, in amending the ESA, had
not implicitly approved the 1978 regulations; rather, Congress had
shifted the overall scope of the Act further towards a domestic
orientation. 73 The revised regulations were a response to this shift,
according to the Secretary. 74 Specifically, the Secretary contended that
since the exemption of § 7, added by the 1978 amendments, only
applied to agency actions within the United States, the consultation
requirements were necessarily limited as well. 7 The court dismissed
this argument, however, by noting that the language cited by the
Secretary- "the Governor of the State in which an agency action
will occur, if any ... may apply to the Secretary for an exemption"-
did not necessarily mean that the exemption provisions limit the
consultation requirement geographically. 76 Finally, the Secretary ar-
gued that the revised regulations were necessary to avoid potential
interference with the sovereignty of foreign nations. The court re-
sponded that the Act was directed at federal agencies and not at
sovereign nations.7 7 Moreover, the court felt powerless to decide
whether the United States' concern for foreign relations outweighed
its concern for foreign wildlife. 78 Such a decision was best left to the
legislature. 79
In reaching its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted reasoning similar to that of the Supreme Court in TVA v.
Hill.80 The issue in both cases was the proper interpretation of the
term "action" as used in the ESA of 1973. Citing the language,
structure, and legislative history of the Act, the Supreme Court and
the Eighth Circuit Court gave "action" a broad interpretation., In
each case, the courts held that to interpret "action" narrowly would
run the risk of undermining the separation of powers as mandated
by the Constitution.8 2 The courts were concerned that such an in-
73 Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 124.
74 Id.
11 Id. at 125.




- 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
11 Id. at 186; Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 125. The TVA Court held
"action" to mean all agency actions and did not limit the term to only prospective
actions as was advanced by TVA. The court in Defenders of Wildlife similarly
interpreted "action" broadly to include all agency actions, including those in foreign
countries. 911 F.2d at 125.
87 TVA, 437 U.S. at 194-95; Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 125.
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terpretation would result in a balancing between policy positions,
thereby intruding upon the exclusive province of Congress. 83 The
TVA Court noted that its appraisal of the wisdom of a particular
course of action selected by Congress was to be put aside in the
process of interpreting a statute 4 Furthermore, the Court emphasized
that the plain language of the statute makes it clear that the particular
course of action selected by Congress was, in this instance, a policy
struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest priorities. 5
Similarly, the court in Defenders of Wildlife concluded that the
Secretary's interpretation that "action" excludes agency activities in
foreign countries would, if adopted, preempt the constitutional re-
quirement of separation of powers. 6 Stating that the Act would not
produce the adverse foreign relations feared by the Secretary, 7 the
court held that it had not been asked to juggle between policy
positions.8 Its job, the court reasoned, was the interpretation of the
statute. The court held that the correct interpretation of the term
"action" encompassed all actions by federal agencies, including those
in foreign countries. 89
The court's holding in Defenders of Wildlife is significant in that
it resolves the issue of whether § 7 of the ESA is extraterritorial in
scope. The court ruled that, subject to a successful appeal to the
Supreme Court, the Interior Department must issue new regulations
which recognize the extraterritorial application of § 7.90 Such regu-
lations, if promulgated, will once again require federal agencies taking
actions in foreign countries to investigate the potential effects those
activities may have on endangered and threatened species. In essence,
the new regulations will reestablish the Endangered Species Act's
emphasis on the worldwide conservation of endangered species.
The renewed extraterritorial scope of § 7 will not, however, likely
result in practical problems for federal agencies. In the 1982 ESA
amendment process, the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Com-
mittee (Committee) observed that compliance with § 7 consultation
" TVA, 437 U.S. at 194-95; Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 125.
', TVA, 437 U.S. at 194-95.
I /d.
Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 125.
', "We note initially that the Act is directed at the actions of federal agencies,
and not at the actions of sovereign nations." Id.
I d.
"Id.
Id. at 118, 125.
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requirements had not been overly burdensome on the federal agen-
cies. 9' At that time, Interior regulations called for the extraterritorial
application of § 7.92 The Committee noted that the consultation
provisions actually could ease the work of federal agencies by serving
as a way to avoid conflicts between species conservation and federal
agency action. 93 It is likely that renewed extraterritorial application
of the ESA will again result in a similiar positive outcome.
Unaddressed by the court and still at issue, however, are the
ramifications of the court's holding on such multilateral financial
institutions as the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (World Bank) and the Inter-American Development Bank. 94
United States delegates sit on the boards of these institutions and
whether their actions-such as voting to approve funding for a project
in a developing nation-constitute "action" as defined under the ESA
remains to be resolved.
Although the court in Defenders of Wildlife affirmed a broad
interpretation of "action" under the ESA, § 7 only applies to federal
agencies. The term "federal agency" is defined by the Act to mean
"any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States." 95
The issue then turns upon whether such a delegate is considered an
"instrumentality" of the United States.
In defining "instrumentality", the Supreme Court has generally
focused on the extent to which the agency or agent involved is
incorporated into the governmental structure. 96 A delegate to the
World Bank may fall within this definition as he or she performs a
function within the United States governmental structure. Moreover,
91 H.R. REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. 24 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2824.
92 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
91 H.R. REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. 24 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2824.
9' The World Bank is a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for
promoting the economic development of United Nations countries primarily through
the use of loans. UNION OF INT'L ASS'N, 1 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS at FF1393 (28th ed. 1991). The Inter-American Development Bank is com-
prised of members of the Organization of American States and is responsible for
accelerating the process of economic and social development of regional developing
member states through the use of loans and technical assistance. Id. at FF1069. See
also Patrick A. Parenteau, Exporting Extinctions- or Building a Future, LEGAL
TEs, Mar. 4, 1991, at 28. [hereinafter Exporting Extinctions].
95 16 U.S.C. § 1532(7) (1988).
" See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 40, 47-48 (1963) (contractors to a
federal agency are not considered "instrumentalities" of the United States).
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the Interior regulations implementing § 7 are applicable to "all actions
in which there is discretionary federal involvement or control. 97
Certainly, under this definition, a delegate's representation of the
United States at a multilateral financial institution could be considered
within the definition of "instrumentality".98
Such an interpretation would produce the remarkable. result that
the World Bank could be held to provisions of the Endangered Species
Act. The consequences of this could produce significant complications
for an institution which finances major projects in developing coun-
tries. 99 Although such consequences appear unrealistic, it must be
noted that the Supreme Court rejected "reasonableness" of the out-
come of the Act's application as a criterion in interpreting the scope
of the ESA. 100
From the foregoing, it should be evident that the Supreme Court's
pending decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife should involve
more than the mere interpretation of the term "actions" as used in
the ESA. The potential application of the ESA to actions by United
States delegates to multilateral financial institutions requires, at the
very least, an examination of the scope of "instrumentalities" as
used in the ESA.
Moreover, other issues remain unresolved and may require inves-
tigation. Whether United States participation in multilateral treaties
requires the application of the ESA to United States activities in
foreign countries continues to be at issue.' 10 Also at issue is whether
- 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (1990).
91 However, compare this interpretation of the breadth of the ESA with President
Carter's proclamation that the National Environmental Policy Act, the most expansive
United States environmental law, does not apply to United States participation in
international conferences and organizations. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg.
1957, 1959 (1979).
India's Narmada Valley Project, funded by the World Bank, calls for the
construction of over 3,000 dams which will inundate up to 90,000 hectares of prime
forest habitat. A preliminary study indicates that 11 species protected under the ESA
are found within the project area and another 10 such species will likely be affected.
Exporting Extinctions, supra note 94, at 28.
11 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 194. See supra note 41 for discussion of pending
amendments to ESA which would require a "reasonable" outcome of the Act's
application.
101 Congress, through the ESA, pledged United States commitment to at least six
international environmental treaties. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4) (1988). None of these
treaties require the application of United States endangered species laws to United
States actions in foreign countries. In particular, the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which is the most
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international custom could compel the ESA's application to United
States activities in foreign countries.102
By holding the ESA applicable to federal agency actions in foreign
countries, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has raised dormant
issues concerning the international application of United States con-
servation laws. Although the ruling will likely have little effect on
the domestic activities of federal agencies, the court's broad inter-
pretation of the ESA will likely affect United States activities in
foreign countries. Moreover, depending on the Supreme Court's ul-
timate ruling, the ESA may be poised to encompass the activities of
those global organizations in which the United States participates.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since its passage in 1973, the Endangered Species Act has been
repeatedly praised as the most comprehensive legislation on the con-
servation of wildlife and plants ever enacted by any nation. Between
1986 and 1990, however, the ESA was stripped of the global scope
originally given it by Congress. This broad scope is evident from an
examination of the language, structure, and legislative history of the
Act. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, the court correctly interpreted
the ESA by holding that § 7 of the Act imposes a duty upon all
federal agencies to consult with the Department of Interior whenever
widely recognized of the six, concerns the illegal trade and transportation of en-
dangered species as opposed to the destruction of their habitat. Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973,
27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. See supra note 70.
102 International environmental legal custom is, however, a rare creature. Custom-
ary law is evidenced by similar legal understandings throughout a majority of the
world. Moreover, the state of a country's environmental law is largely based on the
overall economic development of that country. The more developed a country, the
less that country needs to spur its economy by haphazardly utilizing its natural
resources, e.g., cutting down rain forests, selling the wood, and thereby creating
land capable of cultivation. Consequently, the wide economic disparity between the
nations of the world has led to a similar disparity in their environmental laws.
Moreover, the generally accepted codification of customary international environ-
mental law which influences United States policy does not require application of
the ESA to federal agency actions abroad. The Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law states: (1) that each nation is to ensure that activities within its control do not
cause significant injury to the environment of another state and (2) that each nation
is to conform to generally accepted rules concerning the preservation of the envi-
ronment. RESTATEMENT (THmRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATION LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 601 (Am. Law Inst. 1986) (State Obligations with Respect to Environment
of Other States and the Common Environment).
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any agency action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
an endangered or threatened species.
Jeffery P. Robbins
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